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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 223 
Accident time: 13:55 Accident Date: 09/10/1997 
Where it occurred: Lime Factory, 
Sevarlije, Doboj 
Country: Bosnia Herzegovina 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 27/10/1997 
ID original source: MG/WL Name of source: BiH MAC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMA-2 AP blast Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
metal scrap 
rocks/stones 
route (verge) 
trees 
Date record created: 17/02/2004 Date  last modified: 17/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: BQ679509 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: Doboj  Map series: M709 
Map edition: WGS 84 Map sheet: 2784 III 
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
pressure to work quickly (?) 
inadequate communications (?) 
 
Accident report 
A Board of Inquiry report was ordered by the country MAC and carried out by 
representatives of the PIU, an ex-pat Technical Advisor and a representative from the 
demining company. The report was made available and the following summarises its 
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content. The full BoI report is reproduced (edited for anonymity) in Related papers at the 
“Other documents” tab. 
Work started at 06:45. The team completed one clearance task at 11:00 hours and moved 
after a lunch break to another site close by. The new site was in an area where the group 
had been working for "some weeks". The team comprised a Team Leader (ex-pat), six 
deminers, a medic and a translator.  
Teams were spaced at 50 metres because the Team Leader did not know what the threat 
would be. [The MAC held mine data which was not supplied to the demining group.] Teams 
started work using metal detectors and prodders in two man teams. At 13:00 the deminers 
had a rest break. At 13:45 they returned to work where the victim's team cleared 45 square 
metres in the next hour. Ten minutes later the victim stepped on a mine.  
The accident occurred on the verge of a road beside a river. The 4000m area was "densely" 
vegetated and sloped steeply down to the riverbank. [A photograph showed the area heavily 
overgrown with mature trees and bushes.] Clearance lanes started directly off the asphalt 
roadside. The road was in use and could not be closed for the duration of the task. Metal 
contamination at the site meant that Quality Assurance was to be provided by using dogs 
over the area after manual clearance (rather than 100% metal removal). The accident 
occurred in an area contaminated both subsurface and surface with garbage and fallen 
telephone cables. 
The victim "lost his left foot". He was given "an infusion of fluid" and casevaced 
"successfully". He was later taken to Belgrade for further treatment. 
A QA Monitor was on site, but did not make a statement. The QA team was criticised for not 
accepting information from a local who held it. 
The victim said that he was wearing his protective equipment at the time and did not break 
any SOPs as he worked. 
The investigators decided that the mine was probably a PMA-2 by the crater size. No 
fragments were found. 
The company was funded by the World Bank to clear a set number of metres each month 
(83,200). This was thought to have led to an "inappropriate pressure…to reach commercial 
targets". The company could not "carry forward any excess clearance in one month to 
reduce pressure for the next". The investigators were intensely critical of the contract, but 
recognised that the World Bank disagreed with some of their views. The investigators were 
of the opinion that pressure to work quickly "seems to be implicit and is also due to the 
deminers' knowledge of the terms of the clearance contract".  
The detector in use (not identified) was found capable of detecting "a PMA-2 fuse" at 15cm 
on the site. The crater was 17cm deep, so the investigators believed that the mine was 
buried deeper than usual. 
The investigators observed that most recommendations from previous incidents had been 
acted on. At the time of the incident, the demining group provided every deminer with 
protective clothing and a visor (not a helmet). In areas where fragmentation mines were 
expected, they provided a helmet and visor. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators found no fault with the company's SOPs but said that "insufficient planning 
and lead-time was allowed for the clearance team to be prepared…". They thought that the 
"contractual pressure created an atmosphere of unnecessary urgency", that communications 
between the demining company and the [QA] were inadequate and that the parties involved 
were all interpreting the contract differently. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that where deeply buried mines were expected, detectors 
must be "maintained, operated and tested" appropriately, and listed the detectors approved 
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by the MAC. They thought that the parties involved in the contract should meet regularly, that 
a telephone or radio link to the QA office was desirable, and that the team involved should 
undergo "retraining" for at least a day. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 288 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: 300,000 DM Time to hospital: 57 minutes 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Long visor 
Trousers/leggings 
Protection used: Frag jacket, Long 
visor, Leggings 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
severe Leg 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Leg Below knee 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
No formal medical report was made available. 
Another deminer stated that the victim was talking all the time as he was approached for 
MEDEVAC. 
The medic stated that the victim was born in 1938. He observed that the victim's left leg was 
amputated below the knee and that his right leg had smaller injuries "under joint". He applied 
bandages and stopped the bleeding on his left leg, then attended his right. He then 
administered: Th:Ringer Lactate 1000 ml i.v. Intravenous cannulae, noting that the victim 
was talking and cooperating at all times. His respiration was normal and his pulse "70 in one 
minute".  
He stated that the victim arrived at hospital at 14:52 where they did "RTG of both legs" and 
he was admitted. 
The victim was interviewed on 22nd June 1999 in Zenica, Bosnia Herzegovina. He started by 
saying that he was glad to have lost his leg below the knee because he knew he was better 
off than others who had kept their foot but were crippled and without compensation. He said 
that the detector he was using was an Ebinger but gave the model only as "EBEX". He 
thought that it took only 20 minutes to get to hospital but could remember nothing after the 
accident so assumed he was unconscious. He was wearing leggings at the time of the 
accident. His left foot was traumatically amputated and his right leg was injured between the 
legging and the boot. He showed a long scar laterally across the leg just above the ankle on 
the inside. He believed that the legging reduced the severity of that injury. He had no injuries 
at all above his knees. He said that he was taken to Doboj hospital where he stayed for three 
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days, then moved to Belgrade Hospital on 12th October. He had no treatment in Belgrade 
and asked to be moved.  
On 11th November he was moved to a military hospital and on 13th November they surgically 
amputated his leg removing "some small bone" probably three centimetres. Because much 
of his calf muscle was still intact, they could wrap his stump without grafting.  
 
He allowed his stump to be photographed as shown above.  
On 17th December 1997 he was allowed home. On 12th February 1998 he was given his first 
lower-leg prosthetic. On October 9th 1998 he was issued a second, his stump having "settled 
down".  
The victim received a salary from the demining company until August 1998. In September 
1998 he received 300,000 DM as compensation. He said that nothing could compensate for 
the loss of his leg but that he felt he had been treated fairly - although he was glad that he no 
longer had young children to support.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because 
the investigators clearly felt there was a pressure for speed but did not blame the demining 
company for applying this. The investigators blamed the funder who had built inappropriate 
pressures into the contract. When funders detail the area to be cleared each day, they are 
acting as managers, and in this case must bear some responsibility if the accident occurred 
because of the pressure they imposed. Further investigation of their role by an independent 
person may be desirable.  
 
Related papers 
The file included a detailed map. a sketch map, details from the minefield register showing 
that a row of PMR2-A mines and a row of PROM-1s had been laid in the area, photographs 
of the crater (showing very hard stony ground), a crater drawing estimating depth, 
photographs of the accident site, and pictures of the victim's armour. These documents were 
not made available for copying. 
 
Original BoI report 
The following is the original BoI report, edited for anonymity. 
27 October 1997 
REPORT ON 9 OCTOBER 97 MINE ACCIDENT NEAR LIME FACTORY, DOBOJ 
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Reference   A: Map, Series M709, Sheet 2784-III, Doboj. (WGS 84) 
  B: UN Mine Action Centre Technical Guidelines. Dated 12 July 1997. 
  C: [Demining group 1] Standing Operating Procedures for Demining. Dated May 
1997. 
INTRODUCTION 
1. A mine accident occurred on 9 October 1997 at a demining task site, at Grid Reference 
BQ679509, near the Lime Factory at Sevarlije, Doboj. This accident involved members of 
[Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2]; the company reported the accidents to UN MAC 
on 9 October 1997. [The “company” was a collaborative commercial venture between an 
international and a national company.] 
2. On the day of the accident UN MAC appointed Mr [name excised] as a member of a 
Board of Inquiry to conduct an investigation and report about the accident. Mr [name 
excised], Republika Srpska PIU was appointed as a member of the Board. [Demining 
group 1] and the World Bank were both invited to appoint one member each. Col [name 
excised] attended on behalf of [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2]. The World Bank 
did not provide any assistance to the Board of Inquiry. 
3. UN MAC issued Terms of Reference for the Board of Inquiry. These are shown at Annex 
A to this report. 
4. This is [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2]’s fourth accident since starting the World 
Bank funded contract for Republika Srpska, in June 1997. 
ACTIONS TAKEN AS RESULT OF PREVIOUS ACCIDENTS 
5. Recommendations from previous accident reports have been actioned by the company, 
in particular; 
a. Personnel operating in areas where fragmentation mines are suspected now wear 
helmets with visors. This subject continues to be under review by [Demining group 1] 
management and it may require further investigation, through UN MAC and the 
Technical Working Group. 
b. Personal equipment and hand tools have been the subject of several changes and 
the issue, use and management of these items is now resolved. 
c. Drills and procedures in mined areas have been improved. 
d. Vehicle and radio allocation to work sites has been increased. 
e. Casualty evacuation and communications procedures have been reviewed and 
improved. 
f. Supervision of teams in the field is now subject to a continuous regime of 
supervision by managers and supervisors who are more senior than the team 
leader. 
g. Reporting procedures and documentation have been improved. 
h. The company has ordered MINELAB F1A4 metal detectors for future use. 
6. The following recommendations were made after [Demining group 1] accident on 19 July 
1997. Action remains outstanding to fully implement these recommendations. 
a. If parameters of a mine-clearance task are unclear, advice should be sought from 
the client. 
 – [Demining group 1] Operations Director states that this advice is requested from PIU.  
b. Safety and Quality Assurance should take a greater priority than clearance-rate 
targets.  
- [Demining group 1] management state that they do not pressure their teams into 
moving faster than conditions or safety allows. This claim is supported by answers to 
questions put to team members. However, Pressure now seems to be implicit and is 
also due to the deminers’ knowledge of the terms of the clearance contract. 
CONDUCT OF THE INVESTIGATION 
7. [Name excised] deployed to [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] regional HQ (The 
Lime Factory), from Sarajevo on the day after the accident and arrived at the Lime 
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Factory at 0830hrs. The Operations Director of [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2], 
Colonel [name excised] welcomed the team and stated that he had instructed his 
employees to assist the Board of Inquiry in every way. Throughout the investigation 
[Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] employees assisted the Board considerably by 
their open and helpful attitude. 
8. Shortly after arrival of the Board at the Lime Factory, written statements were requested 
from all members of the team involved. The team members had written statements 
shortly after the accident and these were translated into English prior to the Board’s 
arrival. Statements are shown at Annexes B and C to this report. No statement was 
provided to the Board by the World Bank/PIU Monitor at the site. A sketch map, 
paperwork and reports relating to the day of the accident were prepared for the Board’s 
inspection. 
9. Members of the Board arrived at the scene of the accident at 1030hrs on Fri10 Oct. At 
this time the area of the accident was inspected and an assessment was made of the site 
layout and conduct of [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] operations. 
10. Investigation lasted one day; this included interviews, writing of statements, visits to the 
site of the accident, inspection of documents & maps, and of clothing and equipment 
used by the injured deminer. 
11. The injured deminer was interviewed in Doboj hospital on 10 Oct.  
GENERAL 
12. [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] relations with local people are generally good. 
This relationship is enhanced by the fact that several [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 
2] employees are from the local area. 
13. Personnel from [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] started this task approximately 
two-and-a-half hours before the accident occurred. This task was part of a larger group of 
tasks and this team had been working in this area since 5 July. Doboj Municipality 
request for demining tasking in this area were provided to UN MAC Banja Luka on 26 
May 1997 and passed to [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] through RS PIU. This 
task is number two on the list of Priority One tasks. UN MAC holds minefield records and 
information for the site and surrounding areas. 
14. A [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] demining Team was working the task; this 
consisted of an international (Zimbabwean) team leader, six deminers, a medic and a 
translator. This team was structured in accordance with [Demining group 1]/[Demining 
group 2] regional structure. 
15. Mine involved in this accident was an Anti Personnel mine. No conclusive evidence is 
available to state unequivocally what type of mine it was. No fragments were found during 
the Board of Inquiry’s investigation. From initial crater analysis and local knowledge it is 
considered most likely that the mine involved was a PMA-2. Average depth of the crater 
was 170mm. A detector used at this site was used by the Board of Inquiry to locate a 
PMA-2 fuze at a depth of 150 millimetres on this site. A sketch and photographs of the 
crater dimensions are shown at Annex F to this report. 
GEOGRAPHY 
16. The area that [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] is operating in is inside the Zone of 
Separation, approximately 5 kilometres south of Doboj. 
17. The task site area is on a road verge, next to the River Bosna. This area was mined by 
the VRS as part of the local defensive plan to protect the riverbank and the Lime Factory 
during the war. The task is related to the clearance of the Lime Factory and quarry and 
the water pumping station associated with this site. The area is heavily vegetated and the 
verge slopes steeply from the road down to the riverside. The nearest local residents to 
this site live approximately one kilometre away, in the village of Potocani. Priority for the 
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task was set by the RS PIU, after consultation with the local municipality and the Lime 
factory.  
18. [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] personnel live in and deploy from [Demining 
group 1]/[Demining group 2] local Headquarters at the Lime Factory, Grid Reference 
BQ680509. All local employees live at the Lime Factory. The two team leaders run the 
operation from the factory. Mr [name excised], [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] 
Field Operations Manager for Northern RS, visits the factory and associated work-sites 
twice or three times each week. The organisation of [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 
2] employees at the factory is run on military disciplinary lines. Local staff are allowed out 
only on weekends and there is a strict no-alcohol rule. 
19. Task site from [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] location at the Lime Factory is 
approximately 400 metres, travelling time is approximately three minutes walk. 
WORLD BANK/PIU CONTRACTS WITH [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] 
20. The World Bank funded contract operated by [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] is 
for a clearance rate of 83,200 square metres per month. In order to achieve this target, 
[Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] is required to clear 800 square metres daily on 
each of their four clearance sites. 
21. Deminers and team leaders are aware of this commercial aspect to the contract and it is 
apparent that an inappropriate pressure is felt by management and field workers to reach 
commercial targets.  
22. This subject was mentioned in the Board of Inquiry report after [Demining group 1]’s first 
mine accident, in July 1997. The PIU (World Bank) contract with [Demining group 1] is to 
achieve 500,000 square metres of clearance by the end of the contract, (Budget for the 
contract is for six months.) This is achievable, but a number of aspects of the terms of the 
contract produce what may be unnecessary pressures for deminers in the field.  
23. The contractor claims that; 
a. No allowance is made for the contractor to carry forward into subsequent months 
any square metres that have been cleared above the current month’s target. 
Conversely, the contractor cannot recover any losses. That is, if the contractor fails 
to meet the monthly target in one month, this cannot be made up for in subsequent 
months.  
Comment: As a consequence of this aspect to the contract, deminers seem to feel 
themselves to be on a treadmill and that they must always fulfil daily and monthly 
targets, regardless of difficulty of the task. 
b. The contractor is bound to work at least 26 days every month. Even if the deminers 
fulfil the 83,200 square metres cleared target in less time, they are still obliged to 
work every day to complete a minimum 800 square metres daily. This means that no 
time can be allowed for difficult ground or for planning and preparation of impending 
tasks.  
Comment: [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] employees are currently working 
to a regime where the priority to keep the clearance running at a constant minimum 
of 800 square metres every day is given an exceptional significance. 
24. There is some disagreement from World Bank and PIU with the above statements. 
SITE LAYOUT 
25. The area of the task site, including the Control Point is marked and taped-off. Marking in 
the clearance lanes is adequate. Control Point is in a cleared, flat area of ground, which is 
on the opposite side of the road from the clearance lanes. 
26. The clearance of lanes into the mined area started directly from the side of a 4-metre 
wide asphalt-surfaced road. Because this is a regularly used public road, it is not possible 
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to close the road for the full duration of the clearance task. An SFOR unit is stationed 
approximately two kilometres from the site, therefore it should be possible to close the 
road for planned detonations etc. 
27. The task was to clear an area of approximately 4000 square metres of roadside verge 
and sloping riverbank.  
28. The cleared area of the lane in which the accident occurred consists of a lane 
approximately one metre wide. This lane is approximately five metres from the side of the 
road. This is the third of three one-metre, adjoining clearance lanes in this area. The two 
other clearance lanes were each initiated from the same safe lane. These lanes were all 
cleared by working towards the road. 
SUPERVISION AND QUALITY ASSURANCE 
29. Supervision of clearance and survey teams in this [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] 
region is provided, in the first instance, by team leaders, in this case the team leader was 
a Zimbabwean national with experience in humanitarian demining in Africa. The next line 
of supervision is provided by irregular visits to the sites by one of two Field Operations 
Officers. These visits are supported by occasional visits from the [Demining group 
1]/[Demining group 2] Operations Director, Col [name excised], approximately once each 
week. At the time of the accident [name excised] was in Tuzla. Col [name excised] was at 
[Demining group 1] HQ in Pale, approximately 150 Km away.  
30. An RS PIU monitor, Mr [name excised] is on the site at all times. World Bank Senior 
Monitor, Mr [name excised], last visited the Lime factory sites on 20 September. 
[Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] employees state that clearance operations in the 
area at that time were normal and no safety points were raised. No written reports were 
seen by the Board to confirm or deny this.  
Note: World Bank Senior Technical Adviser is currently using a saloon car. This vehicle 
is not capable of driving over ground necessary to access most [Demining group 
1]/[Demining group 2] work sites. 
31. All visitors to the site are recorded in a site diary. Supervision and Quality Assurance 
visits from [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] managers and supervisors have been 
increased since earlier accidents occurred. 
32. Due to high metal contamination at this site, it is not possible to clear it to 100% metal 
free. Therefore it was planned to use dogs to confirm Quality Assurance after manual 
clearance of the area is completed. 
COMMUNICATIONS 
33. The accident occurred in Republika Srpska. The nearest large town is Doboj. The local 
Danish SFOR base has a military V-Sat telephone. This link is not continuous or reliable. 
34. There is no electricity and no telephone at [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] local 
HQ, in the Lime Factory. 
35. [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] communications to anywhere outside the region is 
generally by HF radio. This set-up allows HF communications to [Demining group 1] HQ 
in Pale and elsewhere. Communications have been improved since [Demining group 1]’s 
first accident.  
36. There is no operations room at [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] regional HQ at the 
Lime Factory. Operations are commanded and controlled from a field level. Co-ordination 
is from HQ Pale and through the Field Operations Manager.  
37. There is no telephone or radio communication from RS PIU to either [Demining group 1] 
or to the UN MAC. 
38. There is no telephone or radio communication from World Bank Senior Technical Adviser 
to either [Demining group 1] or to the UN MAC. 
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MEDICAL 
39. A comprehensive medical kit was on site at the time of the accident. Medic was stationed 
at the Control Point, approximately 100 metres from the scene of the accident. 
Ambulance was on the site. The Casevac operation was successful and the injured 
person was stabilised and despatched to the hospital without further problems, after 
receiving an infusion of fluid.  
40. The nearest hospital to the accident site is at Doboj, approximately 10 Kilometres, 
travelling time is approximately 15 minutes.  
41. The injured deminer, [name excised], lost his left foot during the explosion. He has now 
been evacuated, through [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2]’s insurance plan, to 
Belgrade for further medical treatment. 
42. All [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] personnel at this site are now fully familiar with 
CASEVAC procedures and the route to the Doboj hospital and these are practised and 
recorded regularly. 
PERSONALITIES 
43. Personnel directly involved are as follows.  
 a. Team leader  
 b. Deminer no. 1 – Injured in blast from mine. 
 c. Deminer no. 2  
d. Team Medic. 
e. PIU Monitor at the site. 
DOGS 
44. No mine or explosive detection dogs were involved at this site at any time. Dogs will be 
used to confirm the Quality Assurance process later. 
EQUIPMENT 
45. The Board carried out an informal test on a metal detector used at the site. It was found 
that the detector could locate a PMA-2 fuze at a depth of 150 millimetres on this site. 
Average depth of the crater was 170mm. The blast from the mine would have excavated 
some of the earth underneath the mine. This mine was buried deeper than would 
normally expected. 
46. This area was covered with vegetation prior to the clearance task. After this was cleared, 
a stubble remained on the surface. 
47. The area of ground where the accident occurred is contaminated on the surface and 
underground with metal accumulated from dumping of garbage on the area and with 
overhead electric or telephone cables which have collapsed from their poles, onto the 
ground. This problem limits the use of a metal detector here. 
48. Hand tools used by the demining team were standard prodders, trowels and garden 
pruning shears. These were used in the normal manner, approved by the UN MAC 
Technical and Safety Guidelines.  
DRESS 
49. Full protective clothing and headgear is available for all vulnerable personnel in 
[Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] demining operations. Industrial working boots are 
issued to all demining personnel.  
50. All protective clothing provided by [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] to demining 
teams is designed to provide a minimum protection to the wearer against 1.1g fragments 
travelling at a velocity of 450 metres per second. 
51. Every deminer in every team is issued with a visor. Deminers working in areas where 
fragmentation mines are anticipated are issued with helmets and visors. The injured 
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deminer, [name excised] states that at the time of his accident he was wearing his visor 
and body armour. 
DETAILED ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES ON 9 OCTOBER 1997. 
52. This account is taken from formal and informal interviews and statements from all 
personnel involved. Most interviews took place through interpreters. 
53. Daily Routine.[Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] personnel work to the following 
daily routine. 
a. Start work 0730hrs 
b. Breakfast 0900hrs 
c. Break  1300hrs (Cold drinks and sometimes fruit) 
d. Cease works  1500hrs  
e. Lunch  1600hrs   
f. Dinner  1900hrs   
54. Demining team departed [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] local headquarters at 
Lime Factory as normal at around 0645hrs. They started work on a demining site they 
had been working on prior to moving to the site where the accident occurred, at around 
0700hrs, as normal. A daily briefing from the team commander is normally given to the 
team. Although part of [Demining group 1] SOPs, this daily briefing is an informal, 
unstructured briefing. It covers points relating to safety and the day’s anticipated 
activities.  
55. Lunch was taken for approximately half-an-hour, by all the team together, in the Control 
Point, at around 1100hrs, as normal. 
56. [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2] daily reports show that on the day before the 
accident (Wednesday), the team had cleared 1270 square metres of ground. On the 
Tuesday they had cleared 1300 square metres. On the Monday, 1120 square metres.  
57. The team completed their task at this minefield and departed the task site at 
approximately 1100hrs. This minefield was now completely clear of mines and the team’s 
next task would be elsewhere. 
58. No break was taken and no time-off for the team was given to mark this completed 
clearance. The team knew that they continued to be under pressure to maintain the daily 
clearance of 800 square metres of ground on this day, the same as every day. It was 
therefore not appropriate to celebrate the completed clearance of a minefield or to pause 
in any way between tasks. 
59. The team moved only a few hundred metres, closer to the Lime Factory, to a new mined 
area, next to the main road through the area. 
60. The area that was to be used for the Control Point had been used on a regular basis for 
some time, by local people, for parking and turning vehicles. This intelligence coupled 
with the (incorrect) knowledge that no minefield records existed for this piece of ground, 
pointed to the likelihood of no mines being on this area. The team cleared this area. As 
the hard-topped road was to be used as the Base Line, no Safe Lane needed to be 
cleared. 
61. Deminers were appointed to Clearance Lanes, a minimum of 50 metres apart and work in 
the lanes commenced at around 1200hrs. 
Note. It is normal for lanes to be a minimum of 25 metres apart. On this site the Team 
Leader decided to increase this distance because he did not have any information about 
the area of ground he was to deal with.  
62. Deminers [name excised] and [the victim] were allocated an area next to the road, which 
they began to clear manually, with a metal detector and prodder. They continued this 
clearance until break-time, around 1300hrs. At this time a rest was taken and the 
deminers took cold drinks and coffee. 
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63. After resting for approximately 45 minutes, the deminers returned to work. [The victim] 
continued in the same area and by 1430hrs he had assisted in the clearance of three 
adjacent lanes totalling approximately 45 square metres. [The victim] was using a prodder 
and a detector. 
64.  At about 1440hrs [the victim] stepped on a mine, which detonated, he was standing 
upright when the accident occurred and he states that he did not make any errors in 
SOPs. The mine was just inside the area where [the victim] had cleared. 
65. Casualty evacuation plan was implemented successfully. 
TASKING 
66. The PIU decide whether a target is to be Mine Clearance or Survey without consultation 
with [Demining group 1]/[Demining group 2]. No consultation is required by the contract. 
When taskings for potential clearance targets are provided to contractors. It is understood 
that the contract requires that notice should be given for impending tasks. This is so that 
the contractor has time to reconnoitre and plan clearance tasks. 
67. It is normal for employers to request UN MAC to provide information from the national 
database about potential clearance or survey targets. A target folder of information and 
coloured maps is normally provided to the employer from UN MAC, to be passed on to 
the contractor. In this case no record exists of any information being formally requested 
from UN MAC. PIU states that this information was requested verbally from UN MAC 
Banja Luka in June 1997. 
68. UN MAC holds information about this task site and related areas. A task folder was 
prepared and issued from UN MAC Information department on 3 July 1997. [Demining 
group 1] Operations Director states that he has not seen this information and that it has 
not been made available to the company at any time. UN MAC information about this task 
site is shown at Annex E to this report. 
69. Because the area was overgrown with vegetation, the team leader deduced that local 
people must be wary of using it. Several piles of garbage and building rubble had been 
dumped on some parts of the suspect area. Photographs of the site are shown at Annex 
G to this report. 
SUMMARY 
70. This Demining team was demining in an area of difficult terrain. Insufficient minefield 
records, data and Intelligence was made available for them to use. Mounting and 
preparation for the task was carried out in a hurry. Deminers were not sufficiently 
prepared for the start of a new task so late in the day. Deminers and management were 
under an inappropriate level of commercial pressure to clear at least a minimum-sized 
area daily. The mine involved was probably buried deeper than would normally have 
been expected. 
CONCLUSIONS 
71. No fault was found with [Demining group 1] Standing Operational Procedures or drills. 
72. Insufficient planning and lead-time was allowed for the clearance team to be prepared for 
this task. 
73. Contractual pressures created an atmosphere of unnecessary urgency to the task. 
74. Communication between the contractor and PIU are insufficient. 
75. PIU, World Bank Technical Adviser and [Demining group 1] Operations Director have 
interpreted the contract differently. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
76. Where it is suspected that mines may be buried deeper than would normally be 
anticipated, metal detectors are to be maintained, tested and operated to a standard that 
will promote their capability to detect deep-buried mines to the optimum. 
77. UN MAC recommends the following metal detectors for use in this theatre of operations. 
a. Foerster Minex 4. 
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b. Guartel MD8. 
c. Minelab F1A4. 
d. Vallon ML-1620B. 
78. The terms of the contract should be interpreted in the same way by the World Bank, PIU 
and the contractor. All three parties should meet together on a regular basis to ensure 
that the contract is running appropriately.  
79. The contractor should make a deliberate, overt, sustained effort to reduce the commercial 
pressure felt by field workers to fulfil daily, weekly or monthly quotas of square metres to 
be cleared. 
80. A telephone or radio link from PIU to [Demining group 1] and UN MAC is recommended. 
81. A telephone or radio link from World Bank Senior Technical Adviser to UN MAC and 
[Demining group 1] is recommended. 
82. The demining team involved in this accident should undergo a minimum of one day’s 
retraining. 
  
Annexes: 
Annex A Terms of Reference for Board of Inquiry. 
Annex B Deminers statements in English. 
Annex C Deminers statements in Serbo-Croat. 
Annex D Map provided to [Demining group 1] from PIU. 
Annex E Information from UN MAC database and Archive. 
Annex F Sketch of crater dimensions. 
Annex G Photographs of the Task site. 
Signed: RS PIU, UN Mine Action Centre 
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